I am nothing if not enthused by my idea at the moment. It's a bit like when I decided that I would start to take a picture of every bird in the world. I got as far as 400 after a few years logging them online in two websites - there are 10,300 in the world. I haven't given up but the logging of it online has reached a hiatus for now for several years. Work took over and birdwatching became a holiday based thing.
My great big stupid idea with wargaming then is to try to get two entirely different games to work together to reproduce the entirety of the American Civil War on both a detailed continental map and the tabletop. To play the grand strategic operational level board wargame - The War Between the States 1861-65 by Decision Games (with some sensible modifications and inclusions for historical purposes) but some or all of the time to transfer the resulting battles from the map to the tabletop using probably Volley and Bayonet miniatures rules in its newest "Road to Glory" format (already over 15 years old). They are still highly regarded and widely used.
So essentially to get this :-
To work with this :-
The Boardgame itself is of Medium complexity which is good because we don't want to get too bogged down and is of "High" suitability for Solitaire play. How you split your mind to play both sides of a battle game is worthy of a post all of its own. I will tackle that in due course but another time. Likewise how do you "unknow" information in a game which might be hidden (e.g. intentions or off map detailed dispositions). This is a separate issue - the difficulty with playing solitaire "ab initio" without a complex bot to control one side. Play a COIN game by GMT like A Distant Plane which recreates the political and military situation over a decade in Afghanistan and there is a detailed system for automating the other side. Likewise I have a fantastic simulation of the Battle of Britain by Decision Games especially designed to allow you play as either the RAF or the Luftwaffe against a fully automated opponent. Incidentally I have taken to playing the RAF game in its full Lion/Eagle 2 player format on my own as taking the decisions for either side at the same time from the information that you do or only should have is a fantastic intellectual exercise. You take out bias of knowledge as much as you can and just don't kid yourself. I believe I am well able to cut my mind in two and to see both sides but we all have biases sometimes. Why do we do this ? For the story and the adventure and the intellectual interest. A little bit of bias if you are passionate about a situation or commander is not a fault. As long as you are not re-rolling dice as you don't like a result for "team Me part 1" then thats fine. Bad dice rolls happen. Of course you will root for the RAF when its squadrons are stretched. But that will be because you have been consistent in your strategy of focusing on the radar network and the airfields as the Luftwaffe "team Me part 2" and the political and command targeting system in the games allows you to do so. It is a fantastic game for solo play in all its formats.
Coming back to my new putative system my initial thought is simply to start by playing the game from its first turn in July 1861 in its full Campaign format with initial set up, resources and political stance on the part of Kentucky neutrality (I assume if you have read this far you are interested in the Civil War to a certain degree) and then to address the obvious issue of how to transpose the resulting clash of counters from a tabletop perspective.
I'll take the rest of this post to answer some obvious questions for myself but I want to start with the map and movement and especially movement into combat and how that might transpose to the tabletop.
The Map
I'll start with the map. The map comprises the bulk of the theatre of operations both "East" and "West" including obviously the important areas of Virginia, Pennsylvania and Maryland, the whole span of the Mississippi from North to South, the Atlantic seaboard for conducting detailed blockades and Naval troop passage by the Union and the trans-Mississippi of Texas, Arkansas and so on. I think all that might be missing is a small part of the Far West around New Mexico which saw some limited and fairly small scale actions which were ultimately unsuccessful on the part of the confederacy but which would have little or no bearing on the conduct of the war in the two major theatres. The map at this scale will allow that grand March through Atlanta to the sea by Sherman taking full account of the topography. A Union army trying a frontal assault "On to Richmond" is going to have to contend with the natural barriers of the East/West flowing rivers such as the Potomac, the Rappahannock and the James. Topography and communications is all. have added an ordinary size pen to get an idea of its size on my study floor. From Vicksburg on the lower Mississippi in Alabama to Washington is fully 1,200 miles.
Looking at the detailed map you can see why I would prefer to move armies or Corps on this rather than the abstracted box system that is supported A House Divided Board on the Volley and Bayonet webpage. I will give you an example of why.
A full turn cycle comprises four weekly phases within which we will deal with movement and combat. This is preceded by a strategic phase and there are 13 turn cycles in each year totalling 52 weeks (so just less than a month). This is a simplification but a counter representing an infantry division or brigade dependent on strength has 3 movement points (cavalry 4) which would allow it a potential move of 6 hexes by road in a weekly movement phase. A confederate infantry division retreating from Norfolk to Petersburg during the peninsular campaign of 1862 would need 3 1/2 movement points to cover 7 hexes - the additional hex coming by using the forced march rule and resulting in possible attrition (stragglers and such along the way). An alternative would be to travel by rail from Norfolk to Petersburg providing of course that the rail line has not been cut at some point. Rail movement is covered with the award of monthly rail movement points each of which can carry a single strength point within a division (1 to 10 points in steps on the counters) I think 20 hexes. Rail points for the North are abundant while for the confederacy these are a resource to be husbanded. They represent the availability of box cars and rolling stock as well as time and distance. A final option is to move the men by water up the James estuary - provided of course that the tidal waters were uncontested by the union Navy which at this time they were not. When Norfolk was given up historically the Merrimack (an ironclad) was scuttled and the union Navy was able to shell the defences of Richmond until driven off by Confederate batteries overlooking the James River. In any event the loss of the Merrimack represented the loss of a navigable James river. No movement then by water from Norfolk to Petersburg but it is potentially an option if the confederate invests in riverine or blue water naval resources. So nuance, options and some complexity.
On the similar area of the House Divided map there is a box for Richmond and a box for Petersburg with the single option of a rail line (I believe the rail lines allow a speedier passage for a certain number of troops). A further single blue line for water transport connects Petersburg to Yorktown to the Northwest with a further and separate single rail line going on to Richmond. This is obviously simplified and very abstracted. The boxes are representing zones in effect.
The same piece of water used to connect Petersburg and Yorktown potentially also connects Norfolk and Yorktown in the simpler map. Using the fuller map in my game I would need to position river transports or flotillas to transport men using the waterways. With a clear passage through water something like 40 or 50 hexes can be traversed in a week. The detailed map also gives an option to build fortifications at some point or points along the Peninsular as the confederates in fact did in 3 places on the approach to Richmond. In the simpler campaign an army can fortify but this is then transposed to the table top as works in inches. The option of a number of defence lines along the peninsula would not be invaded. On the more detailed map an army would have an option to leave behind a whole division in those newly built defences or to "slough off" a brigade (1 or two counter steps) as a roadbump to slow an advance. The options gain become far more rich.
Looking at the detailed map it appears to be laid out in 10 mile hexes and this is where it gets exciting for a Geographer. The ground scale in Volley and Bayonet is 1 inch equals 100 yards. That means (exactly) that a mile is 17.6 inches which we could approximate as 18 inches. In theory a hexagonal table that was approximately 15 feet in diameter could contain the entire 10 mile hex at scale. Thats obviously not practical or workable (or is it for a Ghettesburg type battle as a one off on separate tables split so that you can get into the middle ? the best I can probably manage just now without taking over our whole formal living room is about 12 feet by 6 feet. That would still represent 30 per cent of the hex area which is good enough for me.
Ordinarily if the two adjacent hexes have no obvious restrictions on movement between them it should be possible to simply 'generate' a battlefield by reference to obvious lines of communication on the map. There are various further systems for this including terrain cards for foot square sections of the table which are either chosen by the defender who may or may not be able to select their terrain to a certain degree or it can be randomised. It should be possible to take account of the hex type e.g. if it looks like a heavily wooded hex then a Wilderness encounter might take place with limited tracks and so on. This ground has been covered by others before and I can very much lean on their work giving credit where credit is due. It is a fantastic pursuit. The terrain will be the same for both sides - it should be chosen to create an interesting and historically realistic battle. The main thing will be to clearly mark lines of communication, railheads if appropriate and so on.
There are perhaps three more points to make. Where there is an attack across a river then ordinarily in the board game this would place the attacking force at a further significant disadvantage as to how its strength was tallied and applied to combat charts. The combat strength of a counter is halved. To represent this disadvantage I would suggest that (a) the table top represents the hexside as well including a significant river so that (b) the attacking units are required to find a ford or bridge. I can do some investigation as to the state of the river and crossings at the time. This kind of scenario is most likely to occur in the area around Richmond where the topography and troop numbers get congested and are extremely important. There may be the scope for engineering operations and pontoons like at Fredericksburg. In the West there should be plenty of options to cross major waterways which will not all run East/West for either party. As the confederate player I cannot think why you would want to make a contested river crossing in the West but let's see. You will need to slip across the Mississipi at times which usually needs a major crossing or a ferry.
The second consideration will be how the rules will work for units to support an attack or reinforce a defence. In the board game it appears that only the attacker can do this by combining units from one adjacent hex only to attack a mutually adjacent hex. This would appear sensible and could be modelled on the tabletop by a flank attack using e.g. a road if one exists. So in the real world a Corps marching in parallel will be able to march to the sound of the guns. There is a fairly complex system though involving initiative to attack and command. No unit may attack unless it is properly under the command of a leader with the appropriate level of command span. Within the game leaders amplify their command span by using headquarters counters such that say a 4 star general with a command span of 2 should properly be able to command two sets of divisions housed within properly led Corps Headquarters under three star generals as well as his own army headquarters and any attached divisions. Without getting into the weeds on this Leader counters have a star rank which affects how much they should and can command (sometimes with a penalty if they are acting up). Leaders also have a command span which affects the number of direct reports as well as initiative that needs to be rolled in order to attack in the first place. Robert E Lee has five stars after a certain time in the game and an initiative of 4 (so he rolls under 4 to attack) and then uses a command span of 5 to properly order up to 5 properly commanded other corps in his or an adjacent hex to move. How the leaders shake down to be represented on the tabletop is perhaps a topic for another post. For now I think the simple rule that an attacker can reinforce from an adjacent hex should be sufficient.
There is not a facility for a defender to draw on support from an adjacent hex. I might tinker with that but having checked e.g. the timescales of first Manasses or Bull Run it is clear that Joe Johnson's troops were despatched a full six days before the battle itself on word of the union advance from Washington. With weekly turns its should be possible for the defenders to anticipate likely moves and make adjustments to their dispositions accordingly. In other words as the defender you will need to anticipate potential attacks and reinforce accordingly during a prior phase. Movement or an attack is never automatic in any event for attackers and depends on command span and initiative and so on. Large union forces in the early war can be sclerotic. As far as open intelligence from the map neither side had a professional intelligence service. The Union hired at time the Pinkerton detective agency. Information seemed to flow between the sides. Borders and front lines were porous and there were plenty of sympathises embedded in their enemies territories. I will try to account in my decision making for some fog of war.
In this historic example the final rail movement to the battle was undertaken again before the battle itself commenced overnight followed by a final early morning march so that Joe Johnsons surprise addition of troops on the battlefield by the afternoon was pre-meditated by the confederacy and the direct result of a very clear broadcasting of intentions by the Army of Washington. Washington and Maryland themselves were also riddled with confederate spies at the outset of the war. Washington was a sieve for information and you could literally read about the union armies intended movements in the newspapers or ask someone at the bar of the Wiltons hotel.
Given the example of premeditated reinforcement I am minded then not to allow reactive reinforcing movement from an adjacent hex by a defender. Perhaps I should turn the Volley and Bayonet/House Divided campaign rules to see what they say on the matter before making a final decision. Rules can always be bent and in essence I will be writing scenarios on the fly to represent the position in the boardgame. That has to be half the fun of it. It should be an epic "story" as much as a simulation. A final point is whether a defender should be allowed to withdraw to an adjacent hex giving the ground/the hex before a battle takes place. Again from memory this is also dealt with in part by the V & B full war campaign rules which could be adapted.
The first point to make is that ground scale is entirely abstracted as we have seen from the examination of the map around the Peninsula approaches to Richmond. Movement is between boxes with usually a road or railway connecting them and takes place on a monthly basis. Within the scope of a battle though reinforcing movement can take place from box to box. The campaign rules which appear here section 8 have a quite detailed battle generation system which one could co-opt in full taking into account some of the nuances from the War Between the States Rules. Broadly :-
In the preamble to Section 8:Battles there is a description of how cavalry superiority of 2:1 or more would allow an attacker to dictate that a battle should take place. A defender not suffering that cavalry advantage has a right to withdraw unmolested to an adjacent box and give the ground. This could of course result in the loss of an important supply City or so on. With giant squares which cover much larger areas this must represent the early warning of approach and so on. I am not minded to allow this on the smaller map - I think the concept of manoeuvre and being caught or not when armies are in a proximity of possibly less than ten miles in adjacent hexes in the real world has been caught by the attacking leaders successful initiative roll. If e.g George Maclennen facing Beauregard wished to attack but failed his initiative (he is required to throw a 1 !) then later in his movement phase the confederate player will have an opportunity to withdraw and avoid a battle with the lumbering force coming down on him. The initiative rating of commanders provides for that movement and jockeying in the landscape and to force a battle. It also dictates the intensity of a battle that can follow and the potential losses (that I think we just leave to the execution on the tabletop). So to allow perhaps a leader to simply slip away as a reaction within the attacker phase (even on a dice roll) negates perhaps the successful roll of initiative that has already taken place. There is always the opportunity to conduct a withdrawal on the tabletop during a day's battle with certain disadvantages for all or part of an army or for a whole army at nightfall once sunset has been reached according to the time of year. It is built into the multi-day battle system. Holding the field is the main victory criteria to take a "box" and that should probably be the case for a 10 mile hex in our game.
There is ample opportunity then for a defender to anticipate an advance and slip away, screen or slow an advance using a satellite formation in their commanders zone and control or to conduct a tabletop withdrawal with part or all of their army during an encounter. Part of the joy of a campaign is the consideration of which territory can be given or must be held as well as the preservation of combat strength. The confederates can trade space for time to a certain degree but at times will need to dig in to defend a key supply hub or recruitment centre. Allowing a defender to slip away on most occasions where an attacker has managed to both advance in full view and then succeed in achieving the necessary initiative roll to conduct an attack does not seem right. There is greater complexity to the game rules including attacks from March during the movement phase itself but these can all wait for the "off". As a result of this discussion with myself it does not seem right to allow a defender to simply slip away from the approaching guns as a matter of course.
Above Civil War artillery train (All attributions for images at site footer)
At the micro level even stacked forces within the same hex may arrive at different times from elsewhere within the hex dependent on the Road to Victory set up conditions and deployment options opted for (e.g. wings and flank marches, turning manoeuvres and so on). Different elements of the forces will arrive on the tabletop at different times based on a D6 die roll past sunrise (7 am in the Winter and 5 am in the Summer). I think the same or similar rule should apply to the adjacent hex forces commanded to be part of the attack. They are not reacting but are part of a planned move. Perhaps the primary attacking hex could be designated attacker and then the units from the other hex could simply roll with a + 1/+2/+3 modifier (perhaps based on some aspect of the commanders leader counter) so that they are more likely to appear somewhat later despite having received the orders the day before at a staff meeting. The worse that could then happen is that in the Winter a Corps from an adjacent hex tasked with arriving for the commencement of a battle at 8 am could arrive at 4 pm with just a turn to fight before sunset. They will obviously be there for a second day's fighting and indeed other units can arrive during the night phase.
It gets more difficult for the defenders. I either adopt a rule that no defending units can support or allow a limited marching to the guns. I think the reinforcement rule in Volley and Bayonet campaign at 8.4 could be applied to defenders reinforcing by road during the course of battle. There are plenty of instances in the nineteenth century of defenders making a march to the guns of several miles.
I think firstly the unit must be able to conduct the movement under command and with initiative or span as if it was an attacker. A unit that is out of regular command - an orphaned brigade or so forth, and certainly not garrisons or militia should not be capable of reacting in this way. We are dealing with citizen soldiers in the main and if they are regulars or veterans who can force march they should be under decent leadership - so organise the command structure if you want to mutually support.
Secondly there must be a major road available ! I don't think a 10-15 mile march to the guns is possible across farmland. If the adjacent division is across farm fields or through woodland it isn't going to happen.
Thirdly we have to apply an extra + 2 modify on top of the +1/+2/+3 modify that would be picked up on top of the D6. That 3-5 hour delay. A minimum of + 6 might deliver up a fantastic reinforcement onto the battlefield in the afternoon or more likely not. There is always the possibility of a multi-day battle.
Finally I am going to allow for the possibility of a short supporting rail movement. All of the information I can find is that a troop train would move at ten miles an hourly at a maximum. On that basis (1) the rail points must be available (2) there must be a rail link directly to the battle hex and three the arrival modifier should be +1/+2/+3 for their local commander plus + 2 for gathering at the railhead plus an additional hour for each hex travelled travel + the normal D6 for when then start the whole process. This should allow for arrival in the night turn of a multi day battle or possibly at the very end of the day in the Summer if lucky and well led. There should also be a Points limit to the troops that could arrive in this way. Possibly a single brigade for the first day arriving late, the rest of a division over night and a division at tops by noon +1-3 hours the following day once the ferrying option had really commenced ? This might all be too much detail. I can always just allow for a % chance roll if it seems possible that a force might be able to move by rail to support a major battle.
In the slim possibility of a three day multi-day battle we could apply a similar process - one further division at night and another by lunchtime the next day. If reinforcements are available by road more than a hex way they could force march to arrive on day 2 or 3 dicing their arrival through the day however they would again require an independent command. I think with broad principles and some chance it might be possible to start a battle without knowing when a reinforcement might arrive and to keep the information hidden from myself. I could set up a number of boxes and ask a friend to roll the dice and populate the surprise packages to be opened on the designated turns.
I will leave I think this discussion there. It has been good for me to make a start with codifying the issues if not the exact solutions to some movement on the map relating to arrival on the tabletop.
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