Thursday 24 August 2023

War Strategy 1861 - Scott's Annaconda Plan and the Victory and Political System for the Campaign

 


Above : Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan 

Before I dive into the minutiae of the July 1861 strategic turn for my campaign (essentially supply and recruitment) I thought it might be useful to pause and appreciate the historical planning and deliberations on both sides and how this will relate to the rules the campaign taken from the boardgame War Between the States. I have written before about how the Union has to take the battle to the confederacy in order to satisfy its war aim of bringing an end secession through coercion and manage public opinion and outside politcial pressure. Initially it is clear that on the Union side the plan was simply to advance on to Richmond after defeating the confederacy's  main field army in one large engagement. We could call this simple strategy "On to Richmond" ! 

Given the small number of troops in the field and the overwhelming size of the confederate States and disparate nature of political leadership (the cotton states were not entirely wedded to the idea of a Central government and ceding all of their resources to Richmond) this was always was a somewhat naive plan In any event the result of First Manassas or Bull Run on 21 July 1861 soon disavowed the leadership on both sides that this was going to be a short war. The Confederate States provide a theatre of operations larger than Western Europe. In July 1861 the Unions attempt to invade Virginia and force a resolution of the war with 35,000 men was naive. Tecumseh Sherman who was to play such a key role as Grant's trusted lieutenant later in the war privately ridiculed the notion of a call up of 75,000 volunteers for 3 months by stating that "you may as well try and put out the  flames of a burning house with a squirt gun. By the Autumn he was personally bombarding Washington with requests for 200,000 men to deal with fighting in Kentucky alone. He was declared unfit for duty and temporarily removed from his command on the grounds of sanity. He was of course proved a prophet in terms of the utter scale of what was required on the part of the union to bring about a total victory. Eventually and throughout the course of the something in the order of  2 million troops took up arms for the Union and 800,000 for the confederacy.   At the outset of the war the numbers in the field were roughly equal which belies the notion of the "Myth of the lost cause". For the union to achieve and early victory and avoid huge battlefield casualties over 5 years it would need to rapidly take fortified cities in the South which generally requires a battlefield advantage of 3 to 1. At the peak of 1863 the Union only ever had an advantage of 2 to 1 to conduct an offensive to take the a piece of ground the size of Western Europe. 

The reality remained that all the South really had to do to "defeat" the unions strategy was to essentially hang on and fight a defensive campaign. There was a good chance that the North would grow weary of the war and sue for peace once its cost in blood and treasure was fully appreciated by the Union public. 

The Union however did settle on a strategic plan to crush the Confederacy at birth thanks to its its first Generalissimo, and hero of the Mexican War Winfield Scott and it was good one. I have not seen anyone articulate an alternative plan that would have produced a quicker result. The so called Annaconda plan had three elements. Firstly to blockade and occupy where possible the Confederate coastline to prevent the  export of trade goods and the import of war materials such as the rifled musket. Secondly to cut the Confederate States in two with a thrust down the Mississipi from St Louis to the coast. Such a thrust would cut off states such as Arkansas and Texas from the union and again hinder the import of war materials through the Southern Gulf coast. Finally to surround and constrict or apply pressure to the Confederacy including its capital Richmond through the use of the Union's overwhelming manpower in the form of field armies. Whoever created the contemporary print above failed to appreciate the real detail of the plan. There was no real ring of union armies out somewhere West in the Indian territory. The head of the "Great Snake" should be menacing the upper reached of the Mississippi South of St Louis close to the beginning of the war. Geography in a way neatly defines the Union strategy and initially at first it is one that I will aim to follow when wearing my Union forage cap. 

It is worth reviewing how the game itself "War Between the States" deals with Victory as obviously this will further dictate how I set about matter when playing the Union. I am going to use the "Experimental Political Rules" from the 2006 rule book along with all or any amendments in those living rules on the Decision Games website. The system in essence "appreciates" the Unions conundrum and the potential for war weariness bringing early closure to the war. A loss of momentum in the war can very much lead to the loss of the border states, foreign intervention on the part of Britain and France (economic) and potentially an outright  confederate victory. I am really pleased with the way the strategic and political considerations of the war are modelled and how this will direct my thinking for both sides from the map to the tabletop. 

The first way for the Union to win is through a "Historical Victory". If the Union holds each of Nashville, Memphis, New Orleans, Atlanta and Richmond prior to the end of the 200th movement turn in April 1865 (the surrender of Lee at Appomattox Court House) then the Union wins. If not then the Confederates achieve their independence in part or full I guess. This then present some clear war aims for both sides. We do not have to wait until April 1865 or the capture of 5 key cities to resolve issues. There is a variant that tests the position at 11/64 on the Northern Election. If the Union holds four of the five cities the game ends in Union victory and if less than two the Confederates succeed as presumably Lincoln is thrown out of office for a "peace party" or candidate. I am not yet sure if I will adopt that variant given the way in which the main cities are in play in the "experimental poltical rules" (see below). There is nothing to prevent though the variant historical victory rules being played with experimental political point rules. It all adds complexity and at the end of the day the Union has to set about taking those key Confederate cities out of its supply chain. 

The second victory track using the "Political Point" system is far more nuanced. Both sides accumulate points based on war achievements and conditions. The difference between those two scores produces a number which can be rolled against using a D6 on a chart for each of 1861/2, 1863 and 1864/5 by either side making a political appeal. This of itself costs increasing political points for repeated appeals. To give an example in 1861/2 if the Confederates have just 3 political points in their favour or more then the table reads as follows :-

1 F, 2 F, 3 F, 4 Mc, 5 Kc, 6 C

Where F is Foreign intention, Mc is Missouri joining the confederacy, Kc is Kentucky joining the confederacy and C is an outright confederate victory. I will deal in full with the issue of Kentucky and Missouri neutrality and the potential for each to join the Union or the Confederacy in the early stages of the war in a separate post. 

Foreign intervention is a real possibility on the tables if the Confederacy is doing well during 1861/2 with only a slim chance in 1863 if the Confederacy is doing really well. The confederacy will then be recognised by both Britain and France, all import supply points through unblocked ports are doubled and the games ends in 2 years (26 cycles of a strategic turn and four movement turns). This is a fantastic mechanic. If the Confederacy can achieve recognition through some early gains in 1861/2 it can boost its resources and cut short the war. I expect this represents the Great Powers bringing the Union to the table to negotiate a peace out of their own economic interests. The reality was of course that after Antietam and the Emancipation Declaration there was little prospect of a Britain in particular coming to the aid of the Confederacy. Queen Victoria had wept on reading Uncle Tom's Cabin and Britain had been waging a war on the High Seas against the slave trade since 1821. This is again modelled with the Emancipation Proclamation being an option for the Union. The Confederacy gains 5 political points but any  possibility of foreign intervention is prohibited. 

Only a score of + 3 or more in the confederates favour can produce the small chance of an outright  confederate victory in 1861/2. As the war continues the potential results for the Confederacy both improve and the political points difference required to achieve those results. As an example if the confederates are on "0" in 1864 an appeal to the political tables will give them a victory win a roll of 3-6 on a D6. There are a multitude of results in between on a complex matrix. 

At the other end of the scale as the Union racks up larger political points scores it can bring Kentucky or Missouri into the Union or of course achieve an outright Union victory. In 1861/62 with a score of 16 + points the Union end of the table reads as follows :-

1 U, 2 U, 3 Ku, 4 Ku, 5 Mu, 6 Mu 

The Detail then of how each side can score political points in order to seek to gain political advantage or to bring an early end to the War should drive the strategy of both sides. Rather than write reems I will just set it out. As the campaign progresses I will include an updated political point tracker with the unit counter/Volley and Bayonet bases tracker that I have already created. 

Victory Appeals 

Each player can make one free appeal at any stage to the political matrix charts to attempt to secure a victory. A secondary result of foreign intervention or securing Kentucky or Missouri all qualify as failed appeals for the purposes of the points system. Subsequent appeals on the matrix cost points in increasing amounts such that by the fifth attempt the points cost is 16 points.  From the union point of view then there is an art in timing those appeals after a degree of traction has been achieved with other war wins.

Union Political Points 

The amended rules very much expanded the territorial ambitions of the Union beyond the 5 key cities some of which are worth 2-10 points. The other target cities worth a point are Charleston SC, Chattanooga, Corinth MS, Knoxville, Mobile and Vicksburg. A point is also award for the first capture of a confederate fort. A further two points are awarded for taking a basket of smaller cities on the Trans-Mississipi which makes that small theatre of some relevance (so perhaps my criticism of the orientation of the Snake is uncalled for !). There is a point up for grabs for occupying and destroying lead and salt mines in South West Virginia and also for cutting the strategic rail line which runs from Lynchburg Virginia to Cleveland Tennessee. There is also a point available each and every strategic turn that the Mississipi is free of Confederate ironclads, fortifications and river flotillas and every city on the Mississippi is in Union hands i.e complete control of the Mississipi will start a ticking points clock. 

There are battlefield points available for eliminating Corps and Army Headquarters counters (ceases in 1865), causing a Union headquarters force to retreat via combat with 20 per cent or greater casualties and for every 75 counter strength points eliminated by any method (I presume this would include supply attrition as well such that an Army forced away from supply or besieged would be a result for the Union). 

The Union player receives points for the capture and parole of Confederate leaders, for failed Confederate political appeals and also for subsequent Confederate drafts or conscription. 

I love the nuance and detail in this political point system. It should drive the battlefield and political strategy of the Union in a way which makes sense of the geographical and historical context. The tug of relative fortunes is further enhanced by the Confederate political points system. 

Confederate Political Points 

The amended political points systems for the confederacy are genius and display an in depth understanding of the war on the part of the rules writers of War Between the States. 

There are huge points up for grabs for a Confederate capture of Washington (50 !) and ten each for Baltimore, Cincinnati or St. Louis. Further there is a point up for grabs for the capture of a union fort (Fort Pickens then looks like a welcoming target in the South) and for each strategic turn that any one or more of the four target Union Cities are unable to trace a rail route back to the Northern edge of the map. This creates the possibility for aggressive action on the part of the confederacy. Raids in force into Maryland or Ohio or limited cavalry actions. A result from an invasion of the North such as the Gettysburg campaign to chip a few points back prior to an appeal to the political matrix. 

There are similar rules for battlefield victory points, five points from the Emancipation Proclamation,  points from the parole of captured leaders, for  failed victory appeals and from Union drafts and conscription. The rules around drafts and conscription model war weariness very effectively. 

The icing on the cake for me are the points up for grabs if the Union does not pursue an aggressive invasion of the South. These operate almost like a pendulum the intrinsic balance of which is loading against the union as the war progresses. In some ways then the union is on a timetable of conquest and the confederacy if it wishes to bring the war to a close cannot endlessly trade space for time in the hop of hanging on until April 1865. The various points to set our war progress fulcrum or timetable are as follows :-

  • Beginning 1/62 if the confederates occupy  and connect by road or rail any one or more Union Cities other than the four target cities they receive a political point each turn while that condition persists. In three short strategic turns then if the Union failed to oust the Confederates an Appeal to the political matrix could result (on a one in 6 chance) in a Confederate victory !
  • From 8/62 there is a political point each turn up for grabs if the Union has not captured at least four confederate political point cities East of the Mississippi; 
  • Similary from 10/63 for 7 political point cities East of the Mississippi; 
  • from 10/64 for 8 political point cities East of the Mississippi; and
  • if the Union player fails to capture the six trans-mississippi political point cities by 6/64 strategic turn the Confederate player gets the two points instead of the Union.
Mathematically I have not gamed out in my head the  interplay of all of these factors and points however the essence of the "timetable" system to my mind really does capture the sense that the Northern public were going to tire of the war if they could not see an end in sight. It is not a question of the sides simply tallying up points to see who "wins". The points present the opportunity to make a claim against the victory matrix (which in itself can cost points) in order to secure the political victory. 

The whole system models then party and public pressure or delight at strategic progress or battlefield results, foreign intervention and war weariness. I love this system as a whole and hopefully it should not produce a "crazy" or a-historical result or drive a-historical actions. It seems to both encourage the two sides to be doing the sorts of things they ought to have been doing or politically they needed to do and prevent either side from just "sitting" back and allowing the other side any measure of initiative. There his the potential for the tempo to shift for small strategic issues to play out in the "bigger picture" of the war.

If I need a reason to invade to invade Virginia I have one. If I need a reason to resist the invasion of Tennessee rigorously I have one. The Mississippi or Memphis and Vicksburg cannot be given up lightly by the confederacy. The North should be wary or raids in force into Union border States. 

The whole point of a war-games campaign is to tie the tactical horse of battlefield success to the strategic cart so that the two add meaning and richness to each other. The survival of armies in the field in the Western theatre will matter. The loss of a hex with a rail link or access to a waterway will matter for more than mere movement to the next battle. I am very excited about the way the political system in the board game could influence my thinking both for the creation of field armies, their composition and how I use them. If I ever needed a good reason to paint a couple of thousand miniatures I have one ! 

See you in hell Billy Yank ! See you in hell Johnny Reb ! 

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